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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to present a framework for investigating whether and 
how the EU manages to promote security and stability beyond its borders 
through its neighbourhood policy. There is general agreement that the 
European Union has been engaged in promoting democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods since the 
1990s. Further, that this policy has been particularly successful for countries 
with membership prospects, and that the enlargement process has been 
viewed as an important security policy tool. Now that the enlargement process 
seems to be approaching a saturation point, it makes sense to investigate the 
role of the EU beyond candidate and potential candidate countries, asking 
whether the EU may have a security policy role to play in its neighbourhood. 
The overall ambition of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the 
functioning of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – a specific regional 
policy that might replace the enlargement process as the EU’s major 
instrument of security policy. The following three claims are emphasised in 
this paper: First, that it is the successful projection of rules and values beyond 
EU borders that will determine the impact of the EU as a security actor. 
Second, that the level of integration between the EU and its neighbours 
depends on three dimensions: the scope of the association agreements, the 
level of participation in the EU and the level of adaptation to EU rules and 
norms. Finally, that domestic support for closer integration with the EU in the 
neighbouring countries is a necessary condition for the EU to succeed as a 
regional security actor. The paper presents a theoretical framework for 
understanding the ENP as an instrument for building a security community 
and undertakes a comparative study of the functioning of the ENP in the South 
(Morocco and Tunisia) and the East (Ukraine and Moldova). 
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 1. Introduction 
Does the EU have a role as a provider of regional security policy beyond 
its borders? If so, through what mechanisms does it work? Do these 
mechanisms differ in the EU’s Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods? 
These are the main questions addressed in this paper. 
 There is general agreement that the European Union has been 
engaged in promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in 
its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods since the 1990s. Further, 
that this policy has been particularly successful for countries with 
membership prospects, meaning that the enlargement process has 
been viewed as an important security policy tool. Now that the 
enlargement process seems to be approaching a saturation point, it 
makes sense to investigate the role of the EU beyond candidate and 
potential candidate countries, asking whether the EU may have a 
security policy role to play in its neighbourhood. The overall ambition 
of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the functioning of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – a specific regional policy 
that might replace the enlargement process as the EU’s major 
instrument of security policy.  
 I begin by proposing a theoretical framework for understanding 
the ENP as an instrument for building a security community. Next, I 
undertake a comparative study of the functioning of the ENP in two 
partner countries in the South (Morocco and Tunisia) and two in the 
East (Ukraine and Moldova). The empirical comparison is based on four 
individual case studies written according to the framework presented 
in this paper, but also presented as independent working papers 
(Baltag and Bosse 2014, Batora and Navratil 2014, Bremberg and 
Rieker 2014, Dandashly 2014).1 
 
                                                          
1  All these papers have been prepared within the framework of a common project 
funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 2. Integration and regional security 
2.1 The EU as a regional security actor  
There is a sizeable literature on whether the EU is a global actor, as well 
as what kind of actor it is. Oddly enough, much less has been written 
about the EU as a regional power or an institution for building a 
security community in its neighbourhood. In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch 
developed the concept of a ‘security community’, which he saw as a 
form of international cooperation that, under certain circumstances, 
could lead to integration (Deutsch 1957). He argued that a security 
community was formed by participating actors when their people, and 
their political elites in particular, shared stable expectations of peace in 
the present and for the future. Adler and Barnett build on the work of 
Deutsch in their edited volume, Security Communities, from 1998 
(Adler and Barnett 2008). In the chapter on Europe, Ole Wæver states 
that Western Europe is a security community, but adds that Europe as 
such is better understood by the concept of ‘desecuritization’ (Wæver 
1998). However, he says little about the potential of the EU as an 
institution for building security communities beyond its borders. In 
Regions and Powers, Wæver together with Barry Buzan present a 
revised version of Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) 
from 1983 (Buzan and Wæver 2004). They argue that Europe must be 
understood as a Regional Security Complex with the integration 
process at its core. Still, they say little about the actual security 
mechanism of such a complex, other than noting the argument that 
security is ensured by the fear of a return to a situation dominated by 
balance of power. In addition to these seminal works in the field of 
security studies, there are important contributions that address various 
regional dynamics of the EU enlargement process (Bicchi 2006, 
Zielonka 2008, Börzel and Risse 2012a) and the ENP. Surprisingly, 
however, these processes are not usually analysed from a security-
policy perspective – at least, this does not seem to have been the main 
focus.  
While there are good reasons to argue that the EU member-states 
together form a security community (Wæver 1998), the question is 
whether there is a security community building process going on 
beyond the Union’s border, and whether the ENP also can be 
understood as an important instrument in such a process.  
The fact that there are important processes of transition just outside 
the EU’s borders to the south and east, likely to have a massive impact 
on the EU as such and its member-states, makes this an important and 
timely topic to study. In the South, the Arab awakening might have 
impact on the EU – positively if the transition is successful, but 
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negatively if the transition leads to a series of failed states, conflicts 
and greater fundamentalism (Whitman and Juncos 2012). In the East, 
the EU faces challenges, including democratic failure (Delcour 2012) 
and even social unrest and revolutionary tendencies, as the world has 
been witnessing in Ukraine. Such a development might have negative 
consequences for the EU. It is therefore in the Union’s interest to 
contribute to the continuation of positive developments in these 
countries – but is the EU is capable of doing so?  
The EU has the potential to promote security and stability through 
the externalization of rules and values through its Neighbourhood 
Policy. The question is whether it has succeeded. Through a 
comparative study of the most advanced partner countries in the 
European Neighbourhood, this article aims to provide more general 
insights about the relationship between regional integration, 
partnerships and security.  
The analysis here draws on insights from security studies (Buzan 
and Wæver 2004), particularly the literature on security community 
building (Adler and Barnett 1998, Bially 2001, Jervis 2002, Bremberg 
2012) and on Europeanization (Lavanex 2004, Lavanex and 
Schimmelfenning 2009).  
2.2 The EU as a security community building institution  
My argument is based on the overall assumption that the EU is 
primarily a regional security actor, and that it is the development and 
successful projection of common rules and values beyond EU borders 
in various policy areas that constitutes the basis for the EU as a security 
actor. While this is not new, it is often taken for granted and the 
mechanisms through which this regional security actor operates are 
largely understudied. I wish to investigate these mechanisms more 
closely, to provide better understanding about the functioning of the 
EU as a security community building institution beyond its borders. 
My first assumption is that successful projection of rules requires a 
certain level of integration of the partner countries in question into the 
EU, and that such an integration also needs domestic support/domestic 
incentives. By examining both the level of integration and the level of 
attraction, I hope to go beyond the top–down approaches that have 
tended to dominate the literature on external Europeanization. While 
building on the literature that sees external Europeanization as the 
development of (democratic) good governance beyond EU borders 
(Freyburg, et al. 2009), this article also understands this as a process 
that can lead to security community building. 
For such a process to succeed, two conditions have to be met. First, 
the partner country must achieve a certain level of integration with the 
EU, which in turn is dependent on its capacity to integrate. And 
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second, the partner country must see the EU as more attractive than 
other regional actors. 
On this basis, I will make two claims concerning security community 
building or security governance. First, that the level of integration with 
the EU is dependent on three dimensions: the scope of the agreements, 
the level of adaptation to EU norms and rules, and the level of 
participation in the EU. In addition, the domestic institutions and 
capacities must facilitate rather than obstruct such a process of 
integration. Second, that how attractive the EU is perceived as being is 
linked to domestic support for closer integration; and that such 
domestic support, in turn, depends on the effectiveness of the ENP and 
the relative attractiveness of this policy compared to the policies 
offered by competing external actors. In the following, I present the 
various dimensions of both the level of integration and the level of 
attractiveness as well as their theoretical underpinnings.  
2.2.1  The level of integration 
As mentioned, the level of integration is dependent on three 
dimensions: the scope of the association agreements, the level of 
participation, and the level of adaptation. The higher an ENP country 
‘scores’ on these three dimensions, the more EU-integrated it can be 
said to be If also the EU is perceived as attractive by the people, then 
we may argue that the country has become an integral part of the 
European security community. How, then, are the three dimensions of 
integration and their theoretical underpinnings linked to security and 
stability?  
The scope of association agreements 
Here we assume that the broader the scope of the association is – in 
terms of the policy areas covered – the more integrated will that 
associated country be. In turn, this can be expected to have positive 
effects on security and stability in the region. This builds on the basic 
neo-liberal argument of the relationship between interdependence and 
security, or that a high degree of interdependence leads to greater 
interstate cooperation and is therefore a force for stability (Keohane 
and Nye 1977).  
The interdependence argument is also at the basis of the integration 
process as such. After all, it was precisely the wish for lasting peace 
and stability among the European countries after two disastrous world 
wars that made it so important to integrate important national coal and 
steel industries and subsequently other important policy areas until a 
political union was established several decades later. While also other 
factors have contributed to peace and stability in this part of the world, 
there is little doubt that stronger economic integration has been an 
important instrument in creating peaceful co-existence in Europe.  
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Still, the recent integration process goes somewhat beyond the 
interdependence logic in the sense that it also implies political 
integration. According to Buzan and Wæver, a reversal of this process 
is highly unlikely (even in times of serious crisis), since any form of 
fragmentation of the European integration process would have even 
deeper negative security- policy consequences (Buzan and Wæver 
2004). Interestingly, there is a will and possibly a functional need to 
externalize this logic by making it valid also beyond EU borders.  
The enlargement process, and more recently the ENP, has been 
recognized as a continuation of this idea (Lavanex 2004, Kelly 2006, 
Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008, Lavanex and Schimmelfenning 2009, 
Rieker 2012). This understanding of European security is premised on 
a security concept which sees the very process of development of 
common rules and values within various policy areas, as well as the 
successful projection of these rules and values beyond EU borders, as 
constituting the basis for the EU as a security actor.  
In this sense, the EU has developed towards what Adler and Barnett 
have termed a ‘tightly coupled security community’ (Adler and Barnett 
1998, see also Rieker 2006). Whereas a loosely coupled security 
community is low in political integration, a tightly coupled one is 
characterized by a high degree of political integration. The EU, being 
the result of an integration process and thus something in-between an 
international organization and a federal state, has gradually evolved 
and moved towards becoming a more and more tightly coupled security 
community. 
While relations between the EU and the associated members can 
also be characterized by interdependence, the asymmetry between the 
two makes it fruitful to supplement this approach with insights from 
what is often referred to as the ‘theory of hegemonial stability’ (Krasner 
1976, Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, Pedersen 2002). Whereas 
complex interdependence may create peace and stability, regional 
stability is often dependent upon a hegemon that can establish norms 
and rules and then superintend their functioning by enlightened use of 
its capability to encourage other members to comply with these norms 
and rules. In the literature on European integration, these processes are 
often referred to as ‘Europeanization’ (Radaelli 2000, Featherstone 
2002, Olsen 2002). While this literature is primarily interested in 
uncovering the mechanisms through which such processes of norms 
are transferred or compliance takes place, there has also been an 
increased interest in studying the externalization of these rules and 
norms beyond the EU as such (Lavanex 2004, Lavanex and 
Schimmelfenning 2009).  
The present project investigates the scope of the association 
agreements between the EU and selected ENP countries, based on the 
assumption that the more areas these agreements cover and the more 
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binding or committing they are, the more important is the EU as a 
regional security actor.  
Degree of adaptation/Europeanization 
Simply getting an overview of the scope of the agreements, however, is 
not sufficient. It is also important to get a grip on the degree of 
adaptation in terms of adjustment made to EU rules, norms and values 
at the national level. As well as determining the degree of adaptation to 
EU rules (or ‘Europeanization’), such an analysis may also be able to 
show whether these adaptations are real, or mere window-dressing.  
In a special issue of Journal of European Public Policy from 2009 
this topic is examined in relation to the EU’s various categories of 
neighbours. In their introductory article, Lavanex and Schimmelfennig 
discuss the concept of ‘external governance’, which seeks to capture 
the expanding scope of EU rules beyond EU borders. Their article 
examines the theoretical foundations of the concept and identifies 
various institutional modes through which this external governance 
can be said to be effective (Lavanex and Schimmelfenning 2009). They 
distinguish between three sets of factors – institutions, power, and 
domestic structures – and argue that differences in these factors may 
explain why the degree of adaptation to EU standards varies among the 
categories of ‘neighbourhood’ countries. According to an 
institutionalist explanation, the modes and effects of external 
governance are ‘automatically’ shaped by internal EU modes of 
governance and rules. By contrast, the power-based explanation 
focuses on the extent to which the EU has the power to enforce 
compliance in one way or the other. This power will exist only if there is 
perceived interdependence between the EU and the country in 
question. While such a power structure has existed between the EU and 
candidate countries, it is not necessarily present in relation to the 
‘neighbourhood’ countries. Moreover, there may be differences in the 
domestic structures of the neighbouring countries that facilitate 
compliance to varying degrees.  
How then can we investigate the effectiveness of Europeanization or 
‘external governance’ in relation to these neighbouring countries? This 
is a pertinent question, as it can be linked to our assessment of the 
effectiveness of the EU as a regional security actor. There is one 
methodological difficulty here, however: how to determine how much 
adaptation to EU rules is due to pressure from the EU and how much is 
rather an effect of EU rules being part of larger international standards? 
(Barbé, et al. 2009) However, with a focus on the areas of particular 
interest to the EU and with a process-tracing approach, carefully 
examining the temporal order of the various changes and the 
arguments used in justifying these changes, this challenge may be 
overcome. 
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Here I am less concerned with how compliance takes place, and 
more interested in the extent to which it takes place, and whether it has 
a positive effect on stability and security. In this connection, it is 
important that this adaptation is real. One important indication that the 
adaptation is real and not simply window-dressing is if these changes 
also lead to institutional changes, budget increases, and the like. We 
also need to be able to identify adaptation both in relation to the policy 
areas covered by the individual association agreements, and in relation 
to the more specific ENP criteria concerning democracy promotion, 
respect for human rights, rule of law, good governance, market 
economy principles and sustainable development.2 I will assume that 
the higher degree of real adaptation with evidence of implementation, 
the more important is the EU will be as a regional security provider in 
its neighbourhood. 
Degree of participation  
The level of integration and thus also interdependence and stability 
depends not only on the scope of the agreement and the level of 
adaptation to EU rules and norms, but also on the level of actual 
involvement or participation of the associated country in various EU 
policies. The higher the degree of participation in EU policies and the 
more committed a country is, the more likely will it be to build a 
security community. Writing in the 1950s, Karl Deutsch developed the 
concept of a ‘security community’, which he saw as a form of 
international cooperation that, under certain circumstances, could lead 
to integration (Deutsch 1957). Deutsch argued that a security 
community was formed by participating actors when their people, and 
their political elites in particular, shared stable expectations of peace in 
the present and for the future. This perspective represented an 
important break with previous perspectives on macro-politics. His 
approach was more oriented towards the actual practices of the 
participating states and how these practices contribute to develop a 
common identity and a ‘we-feeling’. Whether or not a common identity 
is necessary is not obvious, but at least some kind of shared 
expectations of peaceful co-existence based on interdependence and 
trust should be present. 
According to Pouliot, however, it is certain diplomatic practices that 
lead to the establishment of a security community (Pouliot 2008, 
2010). In his theory of practice of security communities, he argues that 
peace exists in and through practice when the practical sense of 
security officials makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solve 
interstate disputes. Integration is thus dependent on the extent to 
which the partner country participates in various EU policies, as this 
                                                          
2  http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm 
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may ultimately lead to the development of a security community of 
practices.  
The capacity of domestic institutions to change 
As Börzel and Risse argue, Europeanization ‘is unlikely to take place 
unless domestic actors in politics or society take them up and demand 
reforms themselves’ (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 11). Whether or not such 
support exists might hinge on some of the other scope conditions under 
which Börzel and Risse expect diffusion processes to occur and 
succeed: degrees of limited statehood, democracy versus autocracy and 
power asymmetries (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 11-14). In a special issue 
of West European Politics, several case studies investigate these scope 
conditions; the conclusion which might be drawn is that successful 
Europeanization and diffusion of ideas is possible, but depends on 
favourable domestic institutions and political climate (Börzel and Risse 
2012b).  
To get an analytical grip on the role of domestic factors in these 
processes, it might be fruitful to explore the local social structures 
(Stinchcombe 1965) and their potential for mediating the impact and 
implementation of externally projected standards, as these may have 
implications for the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) of 
a country undergoing processes of reform. Such an approach may 
contribute to show that the process of adopting standards is not a 
unified one, but evolves as a multi-layered set of processes involving 
various standardization dynamics in a range of policy fields (Batora 
and Navratil 2014). 
2.2.2  The level of EU attractiveness 
While high scores on the above-mentioned three dimensions, for the 
respective partner countries, are important for the ENP to succeed and 
for the EU to be considered as a security community building 
institution in its neighbourhood, this is not sufficient. Also the level of 
support from the domestic political leadership and important 
constituencies in the partner country will be crucial if the EU is to 
succeed as a regional security actor.  
There are reasons to believe that the stronger (and more democratic) 
the institutions in the partner country are, the more likely it is to have 
domestic support for the reforms proposed by the EU. However, we 
argue that this will be the case only if closer integration with the EU is 
perceived as attractive by domestic public opinion and the domestic 
authorities and important constituencies.  
The attractiveness of the EU in each partner country will depend on 
what the individual partner country is likely to receive from the EU in 
terms of financial assistance, market access, visa policy and the like: in 
other words, on whether the EU is capable of delivering what it 
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promises. This point is particularly relevant in a time of economic crisis 
when the EU might be somewhat less willing to contribute, which 
might lead to less partner-country domestic support for further 
integration.  
The level of attractiveness can also be challenged by other external 
actors with interests in the same region and whether this competition 
weakens or strengthens the EU’s ability to externalize norms and rules. 
For instance, the EU may face competition from powerful actors like 
Russia to the east and Saudi Arabia to the south. 
 
 3. Comparing EU’s security 
community building in the East 
and South 
In this paper I now apply the framework presented above and present a 
comparative examination of four ENP countries – two in the east 
(Ukraine and Moldova) and two in the south (Morocco and Tunisia). 
These four ENP partner countries have been chosen since they are 
considered to be the most advanced ENP states in each region. Of all 
the 16 EU partner countries, Ukraine and Moldova are considered to be 
the most integrated into the EU in the eastern neighbourhood, and 
likewise for Tunisia and Morocco in the southern neighbourhood. Thus, 
they can be seen as being ‘most-likely cases’: we would expect positive 
results in these four countries if the ENP is to be considered as a 
successful regional security policy instrument.  
The empirical analysis here is based on four individual case studies 
(Baltag and Bosse 2014, Batora and Navratil 2014, Bremberg and 
Rieker 2014, Dandashly 2014), which in turn have based their analysis 
on a range of national sources that have provided information about 
the various dimensions of the level of integration and the level of 
attractiveness or domestic support for EU integration. The association 
agreements and action plans have been important for identifying the 
scope of the cooperation. In addition, the annual progress reports 
prepared by the European Commission have been important for 
identifying the level of adaptation and participation, as well as various 
statistics and indexes. Beyond that, all authors have conducted 
interviews with representatives of the authorities in the four partner 
countries.  
My systematic comparison of these four cases starts with the ENP 
approach and its effects in the countries situated in the same region, 
and ends with a more general comparison of this approach in the East 
and in the South. This will enable us to draw some more general 
conclusions about the functioning of the ENP as a security community 
building instrument.  
3.1 ENP East: Comparing Ukraine and Moldova  
Until recently Moldova and Ukraine were on a similar track towards a 
closer integration with the EU. Both had finalized negotiations on the 
Association Agreement and, although the Ukrainian final step had 
been postponed for some time due to the imprisonment of Yulia 
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Tymoshenko, they both had an opportunity to sign the agreement at 
the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013. While 
Moldovan government decided to sign the agreement, Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yanukovych decided to enter into a Customs Union 
with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan instead. The sudden U-turn on 
the part of the Ukrainian authorities has proven to have dramatic 
consequences, immediately leading to massive demonstration and 
revolutionary tendencies in the country. This has made the future of 
EU–Ukraine relations (as well as Ukraine–Russia relations) uncertain.  
Here, however, we study the level of integration that Ukraine had 
reached before these latest events. Turning first to the content of the 
association agreements that the EU has negotiated with Ukraine and 
Moldova, we see that their scope is actually quite comprehensive, as 
they are largely comparable to the 35 chapters that a candidate 
countries has to negotiate. Although structured differently, the 
association agreement covers almost all the same issues. Both are 
highly ambitious documents that expect a wide range of reforms to be 
implemented, a high degree of participation in EU programmes and in 
regional development, with cross-border and civil society cooperation 
(Baltag and Bosse 2014, Batora and Navratil 2014). 
The fact that Ukraine has decided not to sign the agreement means 
that EU–Ukraine relations (at least for the time being) continue to be 
regulated by the PCA from 1994 (Batora and Navratil 2014). And even 
though the Moldovan government did sign the agreement in November 
2013, certain Russian pressures are also felt there. As Baltag and Bosse 
note, one can still not completely exclude a change in policy in 
Moldova like that witnessed in Ukraine (Baltag and Bosse 2014). 
As to level of adaptation, Moldova was categorized by the 2013 EaP 
index as the best performer in terms of approximation, coming in first 
among the six EaP members. Ukraine was number three after Georgia 
(see Table 1.). 
Table 1. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU 
Sector 
cooperation 
Country approximation indices (1=best performer; 0=worst performer) 
 Moldova Georgia Ukraine Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus 
Democracy 0.72 0.54 0.64 0.47 0.31 0.20 
Rule of law 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.51 0.42 0.23 
Justice, Freedom 
and Security  
0.94 0.67 0.76 0.47 0.76 0.43 
Trade and 
Economic 
Cooperation 
0.71 0.54 0.72 0.54 0.57 0.38 
Democracy 0.72 0.54 0.64 0.47 0.31 0.20 
Rule of law 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.51 0.42 0.23 
Source: Baltag and Bosse (2014: 10) 
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According to Batora and Navratil, the main reason why Ukraine has 
struggled with adaptation to EU norms and regulations is that the 
various EU requirements challenge established ways of how things are 
done in Ukraine, in turn creating tension within state institutions 
(Batora and Navratil 2014).  
The level of participation seems quite limited for the Eastern 
European partners. While it is basically non-existent in Ukraine due to 
incompatible institutional structures (Batora and Navratil 2014), the 
participation of the Moldovan officials has been limited to the working 
groups on migration or border management (via FRONTEX). Still, 
Moldovan participation seem to have had noticeable Europeanization 
effects (Baltag and Bosse 2014).  
With these observations in mind, and taking into account the 
comprehensive scope of the AA and the DCFTA, we may conclude that 
Moldova has indeed achieved a certain level of integration with the EU, 
but that this is more limited in the case of Ukraine. In particular, 
Ukraine seems to be struggling to reach a certain level of adaptation 
and participation; Batora and Navratil see this as due largely to the fact 
that its institutions are not modified and the local social structures are 
not compatible with EU standards, which also results in lower 
absorptive capacity (Batora and Navratil 2014). 
As we have seen, there are some challenges concerning integration 
– especially in Ukraine – but how attractive is the EU in these 
countries? According to the European Neighbourhood Barometer (EU 
Neighbourhood Barometer 2012a),perceptions of the EU are rather 
positive. In Moldova 55% of had positive perceptions of the EU, while 
only 12% had negative perceptions (the remainder being either neutral 
or had no opinion). In Ukraine 44% had a positive view, while only 
10% said their perceptions of the EU were negative (EU Neighbourhood 
Barometer 2012a: 35). As for how they perceive their country’s 
relationship with the EU, we see that Moldovans viewed it in a slightly 
more positive manner that did Ukrainians. Further, 62% of the 
Moldovans surveyed deemed the relation ‘fairly good’ or ‘good’ (in 
contrast to 8% who found it ‘fairly bad’ or ‘bad’). In Ukraine, 41% 
characterized the relationship as ‘fairly good’ or ‘good’ (whereas 30% 
found it ‘fairly bad’ or ‘bad’) (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012a: 
44).  
The recent events in Ukraine have also shown that the country is 
torn between Russia and the EU. According to an opinion poll 
conducted by Interfax-Ukraine in November 2013, membership in the 
EU is favoured by 39% of the Ukrainians surveyed, while 37% prefer 
the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Ukraine is 
also split geographically: the EU is mostly chosen over the Customs 
Union in the western and central regions (69% vs. 11%; 43% vs. 27%), 
while the Customs Union is more popular in the southern and eastern 
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regions (51% vs. 29% and 61% vs. 15%). This is also a generational 
issue: EU entry is supported especially by young Ukrainians (52% of 
respondents aged 18–29 and 41% of those aged 30–39), while the 
Customs Union is favoured by older citizens (41% of respondents aged 
50–59, 42% of those aged 60–69, and 48% of respondents above the 
age of 70) (Interfax-Ukraine 2013). 
Even though the EU has a more positive image in Moldova, Russia 
also has a certain attraction. As the contribution by Baltag and Bosse 
indicates, the proportion of those favouring integration with the EU has 
risen in recent years, but the population still remains divided when 
asked to choose between joining the EU (33% in 2011, 16.1% in 2012, 
44.7% in 2013) or the Customs Union (45.6% in 2011, 22.5% in 2012, 
43% in 2013). Interestingly, when asked which country should be a 
major strategic partner of Moldova, most people thought of Russia 
(60.5%) before the EU (23.2%). In contrast, the 58% of respondents 
identified the EU as the actor that most effectively assisted economic 
development in Moldova, as against the 25% who mentioned the 
Single Economic Area with Russia (Baltag and Bosse 2014 pp). 
Moldova and Ukraine are the two ENP Eastern partner countries that 
receive the most of the EU financial support allocated to that 
neighbourhood (see Table 2). With the recent decision to increase this 
budget line, allocations to countries that comply with ENP norms 
(according to the ‘more for more’ principle) will continue to rise.  
Table 2. EU financial support to Eastern ENP countries 
 
 2007–2010* 2011–2013* 
Armenia 98.4 157.3 
Azerbaijan 92 122.5 
Belarus 20 - 
Georgia 120.4 180.3 
Moldova 209.7 273.1 
Ukraine 494 470.1 
Total 1034.5 1203.3 
*Figures in €mill. 
Source: http://www.easternpartnership.org/programmes/country-allocations 
 
On the other hand, Russia is also supporting these countries 
financially. For instance, in December 2013 Russia offered to buy $15 
billion of Ukrainian government bonds and sharply reduce – by 33% – 
the price of natural-gas exports to the country (Rayman 2013). 
This means that it is likely that short-term costs/benefits of 
cooperation with the EU are weighed against the costs/benefits of an 
alternative (short-term) course of action (e.g. non-implementation of 
EU legislation).  
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In Ukraine, such considerations have led to a defection (at least 
temporary) from the AA/DCFTA process. Whether a similar U-turn may 
happen in Moldova is difficult to say. However, according to Baltag and 
Bose, the EU still seem to have a more important power of attraction in 
Moldova, perhaps due to a stronger sense of affiliation with the EU 
than in Ukraine (Baltag and Bosse 2014).  
3.2  ENP South: Comparing Morocco and Tunisia 
There are internal differences in ENP South as well. The most obvious 
difference between the two countries in focus here is that, while 
Tunisia has gone through a revolution and established an electoral 
democracy since 2011, Morocco has undergone a process of less 
profound changes, with a non-elected monarch still in power. 
According a 2013 Freedom House report, however, both countries are 
considered ‘partly free’, with Tunisia having a slightly better score than 
Morocco on political rights and both countries scoring equally with 
regard to civil liberties (see Table 3).  
As to level of integration, both countries already have an association 
agreement with the EU: Tunisia signing in 1998 and Morocco in 2000. 
Both countries have also been awarded  special status in their 
relationship with the EU. Morocco was granted ‘advanced status’ in 
2008, Tunisia was given a ‘privileged partnership’ in 2012. While the 
designations differ, the content is the same, emphasizing the EU’s 
special commitment as well as the willingness of these countries to 
integrate further with the EU. In practical terms this means that the EU 
has established ‘roadmaps’ for expanding the scope of these two 
countries’ relations with the EU. The EU has also recently launched 
negotiations on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, as 
well as signing mobility partnerships with both countries. 
With regard to scope, these agreements are comprehensive, as they 
cover more or less all chapters of the acquis in one way or the other. 
This means that, in terms of scope, they do not differ very much from 
the association agreements negotiated with Moldova and Ukraine. 
Concerning the level of adaptation, however, the differences 
between these agreements become more apparent. When the EU 
emphasizes that both Tunisia and Morocco score fairly well (Bremberg 
and Rieker 2014; Dandashley 2014), we should bear in mind that it is 
alignment to ENP norms and regulation that the EU requires in 
relations to their Southern partners. Even though these countries have 
been granted a special status among the Southern partners, the EU still 
raises concerns about the lack of democracy and judicial independence 
in Morocco and the difficulties linked to the consolidation of a real 
democracy in Tunisia based on mutual recognition of the different 
parties (Bremberg and Rieker 2014, Dandashly 2014). In addition to 
the on-going process of alignment, the two countries have also been 
eager to participate in various EU policies. Due to their special status, 
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both countries have regular meetings with the EU. Both countries have 
also been active in contributing to the EU’s internal security, with a 
particular focus on fighting illegal immigration (Bremberg and Rieker 
2014, Dandashly 2014). Further, Morocco has also participated as a 
third country in some of the EU’s CSDP missions (Bremberg and Rieker 
2014). 
Both Morocco and Tunisia have strong affiliations with Europe, 
linked to their historical ties to France (and Spain in the case of 
Morocco) and to the fact that both countries still have a high number of 
their own citizens living in Europe. This affiliation is perhaps 
particularly strong in Morocco due to its geographical closeness to 
Europe – in fact, Morocco even applied for membership in the EU in 
1987. Even though the commitment to its Southern partners has been 
stressed and confirmed, the amount of funding that the EU transfers is 
still relatively limited, seen in relations to the challenges facing these 
countries. Table 3 shows the overall budget for bilateral EU assistance 
to partner countries in the framework of the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which has been made known 
through the National Indicative Programmes (NIP) 2011–2013, 
released by the European Commission. However, this funding is far 
more important, compared to the EU support to Moldova and Ukraine. 
For instance, Morocco received €58 mill. for the 2011–2013 period, 
whereas Ukraine received €470.1 mill. for the same period. 
Table 3. EU financial support to Southern ENP countries 
 
 2007–2010* 2011–2013* 
Algeria 165 172 
Egypt 141.7 149.8 
Israel ? 6 
Jordan 195.8 223 
Lebanon 139.5 150 
Morocco ? 580.5 
Syria 87.33 129 
Tunisia ? 240 
Total 729.3 1650.3 
 
*Figures in € mill. For some countries, figures on allocations for 2007–2010 
are not available 
Source: http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id=88&id_type=3 
 
Also in the South there are other regional actors that strive for 
influence. For instance, Saudi Arabia has provided some US $3.7 
billion in aid to countries affected by Arab Spring. While most of this 
has gone to Egypt and Jordan, $750 million has been given to Tunisia 
and $1.25 billion to Morocco. While these sums are not insignificant, it 
seems as if the potential long-term benefits of greater integration with 
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the EU are still perceived as more important (Bremberg and Rieker 
2014, Dandashly 2014).  
To some extent this is also confirmed by the European 
Neighbourhood Barometer from 2012 for the Southern partners (EU 
Neighbourhood Barometer 2012b), which shows that 69% of 
Moroccans surveyed had positive perceptions of the EU, while only 4% 
had  negatives perceptions (the remainder were either neutral or had 
no opinion). In Tunisia 56% held positive views, and only 9% said that 
they had negative perceptions of the EU (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 
2012b: 35). When asked about how they perceive the their country’s 
relationship with the EU, 86% of the Moroccans surveyed found the 
relation ‘fairly good’ or ‘good’ (only 7% found it ‘fairly bad’ or ‘bad’). 
The figures for Tunisia are fairly similar: 80% characterized the 
relationship as ‘fairly good’ or ‘good’; and 12% found it ‘fairly bad’ or 
‘bad’) (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012a 42). In this sense Saudi 
Arabia does not represent any real alternative to closer integration with 
the EU.  
Morocco and Tunisia are less integrated into the EU than the two 
Eastern ENP countries analysed above. However, the agreements they 
have with the EU are still quite far-reaching and the results are also 
quite promising: both countries seem to be progressing with gradual 
alignment with ENP norms.  
3.3  ENP East and ENP South 
The European Neighbourhood Policy covers 16 countries – six in the East 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) and ten in the 
South (Algeria, Egypt,  Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia). Unsurprisingly, there is huge variety 
in how this policy is implemented. While we find differences within each 
region, the main difference is still between the EU’s approach to the East 
and to the South. This is due to geographical and cultural factors, but also to 
the different historical relationships that have existed between the EU and its 
eastern and its southern neighbourhood.  
While it is difficult to define where the EU’s eastern borders should 
be drawn, this is not disputed in the southern neighbourhood. On the 
other hand, relations between the EC/EU and the countries on the other 
side of the Mediterranean have a longer history, since these 
relationship started to develop already under the Cold War. Moreover, 
the EU is not really challenged in the South by any powerful regional 
actor, as is the case in its Eastern neighbourhood. It is therefore hard to 
say which of the two regions will be more integrated into the European 
security community in the future. This will depend not only on the 
approaches taken by the EU and by Russia, but also on domestic factors 
in the partner countries, as clearly shown by recent developments in 
Ukraine. 
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However, it is the fact that it is not obvious where the enlargement 
process to the east ends and where the neighbourhood policy begins 
that constitute the main difference between these two approaches. 
While membership is not perceived as a future possibility for the 
partner countries in the South (at least not since Morocco’s application 
for membership was turned down in 1987), this is still a long-term 
ambition for most of the partner countries in the East – even though the 
EU has not yet opened up for the possibility of future membership for 
any of these countries. There are also disagreements among the current 
member-states on this issue. The practical implication of this is that 
while the EU is reluctant to discuss the possibility of future 
membership with its Eastern partner countries, its approach to the East 
is still far more similar to the enlargement process than is its approach 
to the South.  
As the case studies have shown, the EU is more severe in requiring 
real adaptations to the EU acquis in recent negotiations on Association 
Agreements (AAs) with Moldova and Ukraine, while a certain 
alignment to ENP norms seems to suffice in the South. This is why both 
Tunisia and Morocco have had AAs and free trade agreements with the 
EU since 1998 (Tunisia) and 2000 (Morocco). By contrast, Moldova has 
only recently signed an Association Agreement  (2013) after a rather 
cumbersome process, and the Ukrainian authorities decided to reject a 
similar agreement. Due to differing requirements and expectations, 
these agreements vary in content. Moldova’s AA is far more ambitious 
and foresees a higher level of integration with the EU than the 
agreements that both Tunisia and Morocco have negotiated with the 
EU. As argued by Batora and Navratil, the primary difference between 
the EU’s Southern and Eastern partners lies in the in extensive 
economic convergence and adoption of EU legal and technical 
standards in the latter case (Batora and Navratil 2014). 
As EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy Stefan Füle stated in an interview with Radio Free Europe in May 
2013: 
 
The first thing to remember is that the Association Agreements on offer 
for the Eastern Partners do not include a path to EU membership – nor 
do they explicitly exclude one. So the deal is not as sweet as those 
offered to the countries in the Western Balkans, which received paths to 
membership, but it offers a whole lot more than Association 
Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, which excluded eventual 
membership. It took Croatia 12 years from signing a stabilization and 
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association agreement with Brussels to joining the club. Turkey signed 
its association back in 1962 and is still waiting.3 
The proposed budget for the new European Neighbourhood Instrument 
is €15.4 billion for the period 2014–2020, which represents a 27% 
increase compared to the budget of the previous ENPI instrument.4 
In line with the revised Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2011, 
ENI support will focus on the following areas:  
 promoting human rights and the rule of law  
 establishing deep and sustainable democracy and developing a 
thriving civil society   
 sustainable and inclusive growth, including progressive 
integration in the EU internal market   
 mobility and people-to-people contacts, including student 
exchanges  
 regional integration, including Cross-Border Cooperation 
programmes.  
The instrument is also meant to be flexible and follow the ‘more for 
more’ principle, whereby the countries that are the most willing to 
undertake reforms in line with the ENP norms will receive the most. 
That makes it difficult to foresee how the funds will be used and which 
of the two regions will receive more. According to EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle and 
Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs, the EU will  
…allow for more differentiation and for giving incentives for best 
performers who genuinely implement deep and sustainable democracy, 
including respect for human rights, and agreed reform objectives.5  
It is clear that the EU’s decision to increase the ENP budget, as well as 
the recent revision of its approach, came as the direct result of the Arab 
Spring and therefore indicates the EU’s intention to strengthen its 
neighbourhood policy in the South. However, with the recent dramatic 
                                                          
3  http://www.rferl.org/content/eu-association-agreement-
explained/25174247.html 
4   http://www.enpi-info.eu/ENI 
5   http://www.enpi-info.eu/medportal/news/latest/35547/Parliament-approves-
new-European-Neighbourhood-Instrument-with-more-than-€15-billion-in-funding-
for-2014-2020, 
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events in Ukraine there might be changes in how the EU perceives its 
role in the East and in the South. 
There are security challenges in both regions, not improbably linked 
to the lack of consolidated democratic institutions. According to the 
2013 Freedom House report, all four countries are considered as ‘partly 
free’ even though all except Morocco have established democratic 
political systems. As shown in Table 4, Moldova scores highest on 
political rights and civilian liberties, but the differences are not so 
great, even though Moldova has had a democratic system ever since 
1990. 
Table 4. Freedom, political rights and civilian liberties 
 
 Political 
system 
Freedom Political 
rights* 
Civilian 
liberties* 
Political 
system 
Moldova Parliamentary 
democracy 
(since 1990) 
Partly free 3 3 Moldova 
Ukraine Parliamentary 
democracy 
(since 1991)  
Partly free 4 3 Ukraine 
Morocco Authoritarian 
monarchy 
characterized 
by gradual 
political 
liberalization 
Partly free 5 4 Morocco 
Tunisia Parliamentary 
democracy 
(since 2011) 
Partly free 3 4 Tunisia 
Source: Freedom House report 2013: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2013/charts-and-
graphs#.Uw3gv873Kvh  
*Each country is assigned a numerical rating from 1 to 7 for both political 
rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. 
 
As we have seen, there are differences in the EU’s approach towards its 
Eastern and its Southern neighbourhoods. While the approach in the 
East is more similar to the enlargement process with requirements of 
adaptation to the acquis, the approach towards the South has been a 
more flexible process, supporting and stimulating positive 
developments with the requirement of alignment. However, if we had 
to evaluate which of these two approaches has been more successful as 
an instrument for security community building the answer would not 
be self-evident. 
 
 4. Concluding remarks 
As recent events have shown, the European neighbourhood is clearly 
not yet an integrated part of the EU security community. This is evident 
in many of the EU’s southern partner countries in the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring, but also in the east with the recent events in Ukraine. We 
asked: Does the EU have a role as a regional security policy provider 
beyond its borders? If so, through which mechanisms does it work? 
And do these mechanisms differ in its Southern and Eastern 
neighbourhoods?  
While the EU has not been the main actor directly involved in the 
domestic revolutionary events in the south or more recently in the east, 
the EU still plays an important role. It was also the Ukrainian people’s 
frustration over the government’s decision to finally reject the 
Association Agreement with the EU that led to the protests in the first 
place. Moreover, the European Neighbourhood Policy has gained 
renewed attention as a result of these events. It has been revised and 
strengthened. However, its mechanisms are clearly not set up for 
dealing with crises. The current ENP functions best as an instrument for 
supporting positive processes initiated by domestic forces in the 
partner countries. In this sense, it has the potential to contribute to 
long-term security community building. Interestingly, it seems that the 
process in the South, with its focus on alignment with ENP norms 
rather than the cumbersome process of adaptation to the EU acquis, 
might prove to be a more fruitful approach for countries where national 
absorptive capacity still is limited – at least while the long-term goal is 
building a security community, not achieving full EU membership. 
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